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Life Insurance as an Asset in Bankruptcy
D. FREDERiCK BURNETT1
Not every policy of insurance upon a bankrupt's life passes to his
trustee as assets for the benefit of creditors. "While life insurance is
property, it is peculiar property. ' 2 Like other property, it is an asset
only to the extent of his ownership and equity. What constitutes
ownership of such an asset? More accurately, what ownership must
appear to make the policy an asset? And when and why do such
assets pass to the trustee?
These questions arise before the policy matures. For, if the death
contemplated by the policy had happened or the stipulated efflux of
time had occurred before the bankruptcy, the insurer's obligation
would have been consummate and the only inquiry would be the
usual one as to whom belong the proceeds of the policy by its terms.
And if it had occurred after the petition had been filed, the trustee
would gain nothing thereby for the property which vests in him at the
time of adjudication is that which the bankrupt owned at the time the
petition was filed.' The situation we are considering involves no
obligation upon the insurer to pay anybody presently. What prop-
erty in a policy, then, before its maturity, has the insured bankrupt
which may enure as an asset in bankruptcy?
If an ordinary (as distinguished from fraternal or mutual benefit)
life insurance policy is payable absolutely to a beneficiary other than
the insured, say to his wife, and if no power is reserved to him by the
policy to change the beneficiary, such beneficiary has a vested inter-
est,4 although he pays the premiums.5  Neither he nor the insurance
'Professor of Law, New York University.
'Day, J., in Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U. S. 459, 472 (1913).
3Everett v. Judson, 228 U. S. 474, 479 (1913).4Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 212 Ill. 134 (I9O4); Lloyd v. Royal Union Etc.
Co., 245 Fed. 162 (1917), and authorities there collated. But see criticism in
Note, 13 Harv. L. Rev. 682. This textual statement does not apply to policies
issued by fraternal or mutual benefit associations. See cases cited in Lloyd case,
supra, especially Carpenter v. Knapp, ioi Iowa 712 (2897).
5Harleyv. Heist, 86 Ind. 296 (1882). "(It is said * * * that to deny to the
husband, who has paid the premium, the right to dispose of the policy to his own
use, after the death of the wife, imposes upon him a hardship and wrong. A suffi-
cient answer to this is that, if he wishes to retain to himself the control and owner-
ship of the policy in such case, he may so provide in the policy".)
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company, nor both together, may terminate the contract without her
consent except in the manner provided by the policy or the law.
6
Upon his death or the expiration of the time limited in the policy, the
proceeds are hers regardless of his debts. No acts by or against him
can deprive her of the policy or its proceeds, because it is her property
and not his.7  Hence his bankruptcy does not affect it. If he
defaults in payment of the premiums, the policy, of course, may
lapse, but even then its surrender value, if any, is hers, and she may
preserve her rights by paying the premiums herself and thus even-
tually obtain the full insurance."
Our question, therefore, arises only in two situations: I. When the
bankrupt has made or is himself (or his estate or personal representa-
tive) the beneficiary; and II. When the policy has reserved him the
right to change the beneficiary at will and thereby divest the interest
of the beneficiary.
I. Not every policy, however, of which the insured bankrupt is
the beneficiary, passes to his trustee. Whether and what the trustee
takes depends on the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.1
That Act, section 7oa, invests the trustee with title to all property
of the bankrupt which is not exempt, and
"(3) all powers which he might have exercised for his own
benefit * * * (5) property which prior to the filing of his
petition he could by any means have transferred or which might
have been levied upon and sold under judicial process against
him: Provided, that when any bankrupt shall have any insur-
ance policy which has a cash surrender value payable to himself,
his estate or personal representative, he may within thirty days
after the cash surrender value has been ascertained and stated to
the trustee by the company issuing the same, pay or secure to the
trustee the sum so ascertained and stated, and continue to hold,
own and carry such policy free from the clainrs of the creditors
participating in the distribution of his estate under the bank-
ruptcy proceedings, otherwise the policy shall pass to the trustee
as assets * * * "
A cursory reading provokes instant query whether the trustee takes
by virtue of the proviso or by force of the general words preceding it.
sWashington Life Ins. Co. v. Berwald, 97 Tex. ini (1903). To the same effect
despite a reservation in the policy of a right in the insured to change the bene-
ficiary, see Roberts v. Northwestern Nat. Etc. Co., I43 Ga. 780 (1915). The
better view, however, is contra to the Roberts case. See footnote 29, infra.7jackson Bank v. Williams, 77 Miss. 398 (1899).
8Whitehead v. New York Life Ins. Co., 102 N. Y. 143 (I886).
93o Stat. at L. 565, chap. 54i, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1511.
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In those courts which adopted the latter conclusion, the function of
the proviso was confined to delineating those instances which afforded
the bankrupt the right to redeem-by paying the cash surrender
value-certain policies which were deemed otherwise to pass to the
trustee under the operative general words.' 0 In those courts which
reached the former conclusion, the trustee was held to acquire title
to those policies only which conformed to the description of the
proviso, i. e. those having a cash surrender value payable to the
bankrupt or his estate."
It is submitted that these interpretations are neither necessary
alternatives, nor per sese correct; that on the other hand, the true
construction is that the trustee takes by virtue of the general words
of the statute as modified by the specific language of the proviso;
that the real problem involved is not whether the trustee takes by
virtue of one clause or the other but what he takes by force of both;
that what he takes as assets is whatever the bankrupt could get out
of his policy by his own unassisted act at the time of his bankruptcy
and nothing more.
It was not until 1913 that the Federal Supreme Court exploded the
aforesaid latter interpretation which had vested title in the trustee to
all policies of the bankrupt irrespective of their possession of a cash
surrender value. In Burlingham v. Crouse,u that court adverted to
the contrariety of decision inthe lower courts, but, while feeling called
upon "to determine the congressional intent in this respect," actually
upheld neither contention per se. As a decision, it was dispositive
only to the extent above stated. Let it speak for itself.
The question involved was the status of a trustee in bankruptcy tQ
set aside an alleged preferential transfer of insurance policies upon the
life of the bankrupt who died shortly after adjudication. The trans-
fer had been made before the petition in bankruptcy was filed. At
that time the bankrupt was not entitled to any cash surrender value
on the policies, having previously borrowed from the insurer the fll
amount thereof. The Circuit Court of Appeals'3 held that these
policies did not pass as assets, and hence the trustee had no standing
to maintain his suit. The Supreme Court affirmed this decision.
'0Re Becker, io6 Fed. 54 (1901); Re Slingluff, xo6 Fed. 154 (igoo); Re Welling-
113 Fed. 189 (3902); Re Coleman, 136 Fed, 8W (1905); Re Hettling, 17sFed. Op
(i909); Re Orear, 178 Fed. 632 (39 0).
"Re Buelow, 98 Fed. 86 (1899); Re Josephson, 121 Fed. 142 (,90,3); Gould v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 132 Fed. 927 (4904); Morris v. Dod~d, iia Ga. 606
(igoo). For further presentation of the conflicting views, see notes to Re White
26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 4 5 1, and Re Andrews, 41 L. R.. A. (N:. S.) 1:3
4228 U. & 459, 564 (1913).
13181 Fed. 479 (3910)
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It first determined the nature of cash surrender value,' 4 then
examined previous adjudications, 5 and proceeded:
"True it is that life insurance policies are a species of property
and might be held to pass under the general terms of subdiv. 5,
§ 7oa, but a proviso dealing with a class of this property was
inserted and must be given its due weight in construing the
statute. It is also true that a proviso may sometimes mean
simply additional legislation, and not be intended to have the
usual and primary office of a proviso, which is to limit generalities
and exclude from the scope of the statute that which would other-
wise be within its terms.
"This proviso deals with explicitness with the subject of life
insurance held by the bankrupt which has a surrender value.
Originally life insurance policies were contracts in consideration
of annual sums paid as prenmiums for the payment of a fixed sum
on the death of the insured. It is true that such contracts have
been niuch Varied in form since, and policies payable in a period
of years, so as to'become investments and njeans of money saving,
are in coninon use. But most of these policies will be found to
have either a stilulated surender value or an established value,
the aniount of which the companies are willing to pay, and
which brings the policy within the terms of the proviso (Hiscock
v. Mertens, supra), 16 and makes its present value available to the
bankrupt estate. * * *
14The court by Mr. Justice Day said: "Life insurance may be given in a con-
tract providing simply for payment of premiums on a cal=lated basis which
accumulates no surplus for the holder. Such insurance has no surrender value.
Policies, whether payable at the end of a term of years or at death, may be issued
upon a basis of calculation which accumulates a net reserve in favor of the policy
holder, and which forms a consequent basis for the surrender of the policy by the
insured, with advantage to the company upon the payment of a part of this
accumulated reserve."
15Itquoted from Re McKinney, i5 Fed. 535, 537 (z883), as follows: "The first
of these elements, the surrender value of the policy, arises from the fact that the
fixed annual premium is much in excess of the annual risk during the earlier years
of the policy,--an excess made necessary in order-to balance the deficiency of the
same premium to meet the annual risk during the latter years of the policy. This
excess in the premium paid over the annual cost of insurance, with accumulations,
of interest, constitutes the surrender value. Though this excess of premiums
paid is legally the sole property of the company, still in practical effect, though not
in law, it is moneys of the assured, deposited with the company in advance, to
make up the deficiency in later premiums to cover the annual cost of insurance,
instead of being retained by the assured, and paid by him to the company in the
slape of greatly-increased premiums, when the risk is greatest. It is the 'net
reserve' required by law to be kept by the company for the benefit of the assured
and to be maintained to the credit of the policy. So long as the policy remains in
force, the conipany has not practically any beneficial interest in it, except as its
custodian, with the obligation to maintain it unimpaired and suitably invested for
the benefit of the insured. This is the practical, though not the legal, relation of
the company to this fund.
"U'pon the surrender of the policy before the death of the assured, the company,
to be relieved from all responsibility for the increased risk, whichis represented by
this accumulating reserve, could well afford to surrender a considerable pa t of it
to the assured, or his representative. A return of a part in some form or other is
now usually made."
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"Congress undoubtedly had the nature of insurance contracts
in nfnd in passing § 7oa with its proviso. Ordinarily the keeping
up of insurance of either class would require the payment of
premiums perhaps for a number of years. For this purpose the
estate might or nfight not have funds, or the payments might be
so deferred as to unduly embarrass the settlement of the estate.
Congress recognized also that many policies at the time of bank-
ruptcy might havl a very considerable present value which a
bankrupt could realize by surrendering his policy to the com-
pany. We think it was this latter sum that the act intended to
secure to creditors by requiring its payment to the trustee as a
condition of keeping the policy alive. In passing this statute
Congress intended, while exacting this much, thatwhenthat sum
was realized to the estate, the bankrupt should be permitted to
retain the insurance which, because of advancing years or declin-
ing health, it nfight be impossible for him to replace. It is the
two-fold purpose of the bankruptcy act to convert the estate of
the bankrupt into cash and distribute it among creditors, and
then to give the bankrupt a fresh start with such exemptions and
rights as the statute left untouched. In the light of this policy
the act must be construed. We think it was the purpose of
Congress to pass to the trustee that sum which was available to
the bankrupt at the time of bankruptcy as a cash asset; other-
wise to leave to the insured the benefit of his life insurance.
* * * As we have construed the statute, its purpose was to
vest the surrender value inthe trustee for thebenefit of the credi-
tors, and not otherwise to limit the bankrupt in dealing with his
policy."
As a decision, it disposes of the notion-the aforesaid latter inter-
pretation-that what passed to the trustee by the general words was
unaffected by the proviso save by way of redemption in certain
instances. It holds that the proviso must be given due weight-nay
more, great moment-in construing the statute as a whole. It is
decisive of what the trustee takes. It is silent on the question by
which clause he takes. Is it not eloquent, the ratio decidendi con-
sidered, that he takes by both?
Unless the policy may be cashed, it is quite worthless, at least
highly speculative. Why penalize the bankrupt by forfeiture of his
policy without affording commensurate benefit to the creditors?
The decision is sound.
This decision was supplemented at the same term by Everett v.
Judson,17 which held that the time when the petition in bankruptcy
is filed determines when the cash surrender value is to be ascertained,
and hence, the bankrupt's death intervening, adjudication does not
convert the surplus proceeds above such cash surrender value into
lIdnfra, note 20.
17228 U. S. 474 (1913).
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assets, and was further supplemented by Andrews v. Partridge8 which
adjudged to such bankrupt's executor the policy proceeds deducting
such cash surrender value.
It remains to consider the former alternative interpretation afore-
said. Because cash surrender value is thus determined to be an
essential ingredient of life insurance policies as assets upon bank-
ruptcy, emphasis although not origin, has been given to the idea that
the sole source of the trustee's title to such policies is found in the
proviso; that he takes only those which conform to the description
therein. We may conveniently postpone this inquiry until we con-
sider the second major point of this paper. In the meantime it may
be profitable to determine what constitutes the existence of cash
surrender value within the rule.
Payment by the insurer of such cash surrender value need not be
expressly stipulated in the policy.19  It suffices if the insurance com-
pany recognizes that the policy possesses a cash surrender value and
is universally, as distinguished from a chance concession, willing to
pay that value upon surrender of the policy according to fixed and
uniform rates.2 0  But in the absence of express stipulation in the
18228 U. S. 479 (1913).
19Holden v. Stratton, 198 U. S. 202 (19o5), (sembk). In this case it was held
that the trustee had no right to any policy if the- same was exempt under state
laws. The court said: "As § 7oa deals only with property which, not being
exempt, passesto the trustee, the mission of the proviso was, in the interest of the
perpetuation of policies of life insurance, to provide a rule by which, where such
policies.passed to the trustee because they were not exempt, if they had a surren-
der value, their future operation could be preserved by vesting the bankrupt with
the privilege of paying such surren~ter value whereby the policy would be with-
drawn out of the category of an asset of the estate. That is to say, the purpose ofthe proviso was to confer a benefit upon the insured bankrupt by limiting the
character of the interest in a nonexempt life insurance policy which should passto the trustee, and not to cause such a policy when exempt to become an asset of
the estate. When the purpose of the proviso is thus ascertained it beconies
apparent that to maintain the construction which the argument seeks to affix to
the proviso would cause it to produce a result diametrically opposed to its spirit
and to the purpose it was intended to subserve."
201Hisock v. Mertens, 205 U. S. 202 (1907); Matter of Gannon, 58 N. Y. L. 3.
(C. C. A.) 923 (I917). In the Mertens case, the court, by Mr. Justice McKenna,
said: "What possible difference could it make whether the surrender value was
stipulated in a policy or universally recognized by the companies? In either case
the purpose of the statute would be subserved, which was to secure to the trustee
the sum of such value and to enable the bankrupt to 'continue to hold, own, and
carry such policy free from the claims of the creditors participating in the distribu-
tion of the estate under the bankruptcy proceedings.'"
In the Gannon case, the court, by Rogers, Cir. J., said: "The phrase 'surrender
value' we think, must now be held to cover any and every policy which the insured
by his own efforts, unassisted by any beneficiary or assignee, can obtain from the
insurer in cash and in cancellation of the policy at the date of the petition filed, the
amount being determined in accordance with a fixed and definite method of com-
pensation, uniform in all cases. The amount which ean be thus obtained is the
cash surrender value of the policy. It makes no difference whether the amount he
can obtain is secured to him by a statute, or rests upon the mere willingness of the
company to buy out the policy at the particular time. The material and import-
ant fact is at the time of the adjudication the policy had a value which the com-
pany was willing to pay and which the bankrupt by his own act could obtain."
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policy, a failure by the trustee to duly prove the existence in fact of-
such universal willingness of the particular insuring company to buy
out its policies is fatal to his claim in respect of the particular policy.2'
The creditors lose, not because such policy was not an asset, but
because the trustee failed to establish that it had a cash surrender
value.
Even if a policy has a surrender value as above defined, it will not
pass to the trustee unless it is payable exclusively to the bankrupt, his
estate or personal representative. If consent or a receipt or release is
required to be given or executed by someone other than the insured, or
in conjunction with him, the trustee has no interest therein.Y
The decisions last cited are sound. Their true ground is that the
beneficiary has a vested interest not only in the policy but in the cash
surrender value of which they cannot be deprived by any act by or
against the bankrupt. The transition, however, is but slight to the
dangerous premise that the trustee cannot take simply because the
cash surrender value is not worded as payable to the bankrupt or his
estate or, in other words, that to be assets in his hands, the policy
must conform to the proviso which is the sole source of his title thereto.
And this revives the old contention, the aforesaid former interpreta-
tion, which we had left in abeyance.
II. Assume that the policy has reserved the insured bankrupt the
right to change the beneficiary at will. Although he may have named
some beneficiary other than himself, and hence the cash surrender
value is not, in terms, "payable to himself, his estate or personal
representative", his power of control, his ownership of the policy is
such that he might any time after issuance and at the very moment
of bankruptcy have caused it to be so made payable.
Here let us attend with care. The policy is a contract to be con-
strued according to its terms. The phraseology of contractual terms
is without end. There is no magic in a contract of life insurance
which reserves the insured a right to change the beneficiary. It is a
plain question of construction. The result we have just reached
was attained because the said reserved right was to change at wul.
If it is so expressly stipulated in the policy, or if the court determines
the language of the reservation tantamount thereto, the result is as
mentioned in the preceding paragraph.2 Otherwise, if the right
21Matter of Gannon, supra, note 20.
nMatter of Lyon, 32 Am. B. R. 483 (I914); In re Eddy, 36 Am. B. R. 294
(1915).nThus, in Townsendv. Fidelity& Casualty Co., 163 Iowa 713 (1913), the policy
provided: "The consent of the beneficiary shall not be required to the * * *
change of beneficiary or to any other change in the policy." Held, there being no
restrictions upon the right of insured to change the beneficiaries in such manner as
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depends upon the consent of the beneficiary or some release or receipt
to be given by the latter.2 Such a "right" is more in the nature of an
expression of volition by the insurer conditioned on the willingness of
the original beneficiary. Such a right does not make the insured the
owner of the policy-it lacks the essential qualities of dominion, the
power to control. Again, if the right, although independent of the
beneficiary, and consequently at will within the definition, is circum-
scribed by restrictions or hedged by precedent or concurrent condi-
tions, compliance therewith must be had in order to effectually change
the beneficiary.2 In short, in dealing with these cases on change of
beneficiary, distinction must be made not only as to whether the right
is to change at will or not, but also between the reservation of the
right and the exercise thereof.
Bearing in mind these distinctions, the following corollaries appear:
(a) Unless the right is so reserved as to change at wilt, a policy,
the beneficiary of which is one other than the insured bankrupt, by
no possibility may become-an asset upon bankruptcy. For, in such
case, the beneficiary and not the insured is the owner.26 And like
other property a policy may, at the most, be an asset only to the
extent of the ownership of the insured therein. (b) Independent of
exercise, the mere reservation of a power to change the beneficiary
prevents the interest of the beneficiary from vesting during the life-
he might elect, such a change might be effected by the last will and testament of
insured. Hence the specific legatee of the policy was entitled to its proceeds to the
exclusion of the beneficiary named in the policy itself.
2Cf. note 22, supra.21Thus, in Lloyd v. Royal Union Etc: Co., 245 Fed. 162 (1917), the policy pro-
vided: "The insured may at any time * * * designate a new beneficiary
* * * by filing written request therefor at the home office, together with this
policy; such change to take effect on the indorsement thereof on the policy by the
company." After divorce from plaintiff, the original beneficiary named in the
policy, the insured requested a change of beneficiary which was permitted by the
insurer without production of the policy because of his representation that the
same was lost. Upon his death, the proceeds were paid to the new beneficiary.
Later, at the suit of the plaintiff, recovery was allowed her on the original policy.
Reed, D. J., sid: '"The defendant knew that plaintiff was named as beneficiary.
in the policy, and should have known that upon its issuance and delivery she
acquired an interest therein that could only be divested by a strict compliance
with the terms it had so written. Instead of such compliance, it accepted from
the insured his affidavit that the policy was lost (when in fact it had not been) and
his agreement of indemnity therein, and issued in lieu thereof a duplicate, upon
which it indorsed the name of his mother as beneficiary, in lieu of the plaintiff, in
plain violation of the terms of the policy. If it shall suffer because of such
attempted change, it will be because of its own disregard of the contract it had so
written."26See note 4 et seq., supra; also Central Bank v. Hume, 128 U. S. 195 (1888),
where Mr. Chief Justice Fuller said: "It is indeed the general rule that a policy
of insurance (ordinary life) and the money to become due under it belong, the
moment it is issued, to the person or persons named in it as the beneficiary or bene-
ficiaries, and there is no power in the person procuring the insurance, by any act
of his, by deed or by will, to transfer to any other person the interest of the person
named without his or their consent."
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time of the beneficiary,27 provided the right was at will as above
defined. The beneficiary under such a policy acquires no right of any
kind which he can assign or transfer to another until the death of the
insured.28 Until then, he has no interest to release.2'The property
in such a policy is in the insured and not in the beneficiary."0 It is,
2-lTicks v. Northwestern Mutual Etc. Co., I66 Iowa 532 (1914). ("She [the
beneficiary] was not a party to the insurance contract, nor would she become a
party to it until her relation thereto should be fixed by the death of the insured
without having appointed a new beneficiary * * *. The substance of the
contract evidenced by a policy of this kind is that the insurer will pay the pre-
scribed benefit to the person whom the insured shall have last designated to
receive it. The appointment or designation made in the policy as issued is tenta-
tive only, and continues only until the insured shall have named some other
person, or until his power so to do shall have been terminated by his death.")
See also Denver Life Ins. Co. v. Crane, 19 Colo. App. 191 (1903), and Milne v.
Northwestern Ins. Co., 23 Misc. (N. Y.) 553 (1898).
2aCarpenter v. Knapp, ioi Iowa 729 (1897).
29Equitable Life Assur. Society v. Stough, 45 Ind. App. 411 (19o9). Held,
since beneficiary had no vested right because of the reserved power to change bene-
ficiary at will, the insured and insurer had the same power to rescind the contract
by mutual agreement as they had to make it.
In Roberts v. Northwestern National Etc. Co., 143 Ga. 780 (I915), the policy
permitted a change of beneficiary by filing written notice thereof at the home office
accompanied by the policy for suitable endorsement thereon. Instead, the insured
surrendered the policy for cancellation which was then made. Held, the bene-
ficiary may recover. The Court reached this remarkable conclusion as follows:
"There was no attempt by the insurer and insured, in the instant case, to change
or substitute a different beneficiary. The insured reserved that right in his
policy, but did not act upon it. The insured and insurer attempted to surrender
and cancel the policy, contending that, as the insured reserved the right to change
the beneficiary, he had the right to agree with the insurer upon the cancellation
and surrender of the policy. The right to change the beneficiary in an ordinary
life insurance policy does not include the power to surrender and cancel without
the consent of the beneficiary. The right to change the beneficiary is quite differ-
ent from the right to surrender the policy for the purpose of cancellation; as the
former contemplates modification and continued existence of the policy, while the
latter contemplates its complete destruction. Holder v. Prudential Ins. Co., 77
S. C. 299."
It is submitted that even if the insured had not, in fact, exercised the right
expressly reserved to him by the policy-because he failed to file a written notice
at the home office (cf. note 25, supra)-still the mere reservation of the right
inhibited the accession by the beneficiary of any right or interest in the policy,proprietary or contractual, until death of the insured at which time there was
nothing in existence to which her right could attach. Cf. Note, 31 Harv. L. Rev.658 (Feb., 1918).3 0Hicks v. Northwestern Mutual Et. Co., supra, note 27.
In Sea v. Conrad, 15 Ky. 51 (I913), a wife was beneficiary under a policy which
reserved the right to change beneficiary. Later, a decree of divorce contained an
order restoring to each party the property either had obtained from the other by
reason of the marriage. She retained physical possession of the policy. He never
made a change of beneficiary. Held, the judgment in that divorce divested her
of all right to and interest in the proceeds. Cf. note 25, supra.
And this is true even if the premiums are paid by the beneficiary. Such pay-
ment merely affords her an equitable right to be reimbursed out of the proceeds of
the policy the amount of the premiums so paid by her, with interest on each from
the time it was paid. Schaubergerv. Morel's Admr., 168 Ky. 368 (I916).
Such policies are the property of the hosband, and his wife has no interest in
them except as beneficiary, subject to his right to change. Therefore, after a
decree of nullity, she had no right to keep it alive, in the absence of an insurable
interest in the life of insured. Western & Southern Etc. Co., v. Webster, 189S. W. (Ky.) 429 (1916).
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therefore, an asset in his hands. Is it in the hands of his trustee upon
bankruptcy, he not having yet exercised his right? Is the affirmative
converse of the preceding corollary true?
Or, to revert to the old contention, has the insured, in such instance,
in the language of the statute" preceding the proviso, a power "which
he might have exercised for his benefit;" has he "property which
prior to the filing of his petition he could by any means have trans-
ferred". Or are these statutory words idle and nugatory so far as
insurance policies are concerned? Must the trustee to take such a
policy as assets prove it within the description of the proviso? Some
cases have so held.
32
In Cohen v. Samuels,3 the policy was payable to certain relatives of
the insured barikrupt. It had a cash surrender value at the time of
adjudication 4 which the insurer was willing to pay. It reserved to
him the right at will to change the beneficiaries without the latter's
consent. Held, the trustee was entitled to the cash surrender value
as assets.
Thus once again, the Federal Supreme Court has clarified the
atmosphere of conflicting decisions enveloping our subject, this time
effectually quelling the notion that the trustee takes solely by virtue
of the proviso. The Court, by Mr. Justice McKenna, said:
"Regarding the section in its entirety there would seem to be
no difficulty in its interpretation, but we are admonished * * *
that there are considerations which give particular control to
the proviso and distinguish between insurance policies and other
property which the bankrupt can transfer or which can be levied
upon and sold under judicial process against him (subdiv. 5).
We have given attention to those considerations and feel their
strength, but they are opposed by other considerations. It might
indeed be that it would better fulfill the protection of insurance
by considering the proviso alone and literally regarding the policy
at the moment of adjudication, and if it be not payable then in
words to the bankrupt-no matter what rights or powers are
reserved by him, no matter what its pecuniary facilities and value
is to him-to consider that he has no property in it. But we
think such construction is untenable. The declaration of sub-
division 3 is that 'powers which he might have exercised for his
own benefit shall in turn be vested in the trustee,' and there is
vested in him as well all property that the bankrupt could trans-
fer or which by judicial process could be subjected to his debts,
'tSee note 9, supra.
2Re Samuels, 237 Fed. 796 (1917); Cf. Re Hammcl, 221 Fed. 56 (1916); Re
Arkin, 231 Fed. 947 (1916). Contra; Re Shoemaker, 225 Fed. 329 (1915); Re
Bonvillain, 232 Fed. 370 (1916); Malone v. Cohn, 236 Fed. 882 (1936i.
3338 Sup. Ct. Rep. 36 (1917).
USic. But see Everett v. Judson, supra, note 17.
3
1Cf. Note, 27 Yale Law Jour. 403 (Jan. 1918).
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and especially as to insurance policies which have a cash surren-
der value payable to himself, his estate or personal representative.
It is true the policies in question here are not so payable, but they
can be- or could have been so payable at his own will and by
simple declaration. Under such conditions to hold that there
was nothing of property to vest in the trustee would be to make
an insurance policy a shelter for valuable assets, and it mnght be
a refuge for fraud. And our conclusions would be the same if
we regarded the proviso alone."
The dictum does not mar the decision," for, in view of the conten-
tion raised and the ratio decidendi expressed, it merely means that
even if the court had concluded to consider the proviso alone, the
word "payable" therein was to be construed liberally and not literally,
and hence the result would have been the same.
A life insurance policy, therefore, is an asset upon bankruptcy, to
the extent of the cash avails which the insured might have obtained
therefrom by his own unassisted act at the time of the petition in
banlruptcy.
Of course, if the policy is exempt under state laws, it cannot become
an asset36, though the right to change the beneficiary is reserved to the
insured.
37
It follows that if an insured has procured his policy with the sole
motive of providing protection to his dependents, a clause therein
reserving to him the power to change the beneficiaries may have the
legal effect of depriving them of that absolute protection he intended.
New York University,
April, 1918.
"See express exception in Bankruptcy Act quoted ante at footnote 9; also
decision in Holden v. Stratton cited in footnote i9.
37Re Fetterman, 243 Fed. 975 (1917).
